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FEDERAL REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION:
RATES AND BUSINESS PRACTICES*
A. J. THOMAS, JR."
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INTRODUCTION

HE Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938' sets the pattern of regula-

tion for the air transport industry and is the charter for civil
aviation. This legislation has for its purpose the regulation, control, and development of civil aviation and it effectuates this
control by the creation of an administrative body now known as
the Civil Aeronautics Board. Thus, with the passage of the Act,
the need for an agency primarily interested in regulating and fostering civil aviation was fulfilled.' Safety and economic controlflowed from a single command, in itself a vast improvement over
the past, for probably in no other industry do considerations of
safety so affect the economic well-being of an industry as in air
transportation! For the first time economic regulation of air carriers was provided. Formerly there had been no control of this
type, other than an indirect control over the operation of air mail
carriers."
The domestic economic regulatory policy of the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect to the fixing of rates and fares for the
transportation of mail, passengers, and property, and the control

effected over those business practices of the airlines which bear
*Prepared as part of a Master of Laws Thesis at the University of Michigan Law
School, 1947.
tAssistant Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University.
1 52 STAT. 973 (1938),49 U. S. C. § 401 (1940).
2 Altschul, Economic Regulation of Air Transport, 12 J. Am L 163 (1941).

SFIRST ANNUAL REPORT or THE CvIL AERONAUTICS AuTorrY, 2 (1939).
RwmE,Cnx AmoNAmmcs ACT ANNOTATED, 97 (1939).
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upon the issues of competition and monopoly within the air carrier industry are the subjects for consideration here. The importance of these regulations of an economic nature as embodied in
the Civil Aeronautics Act cannot be overemphasized for the continued development and encouragement of civil aviation depend
upon the wisdom, utility, and adaptability of these regulations and
the intelligent administration of the industry thereunder.
THE REGULATION OF PASSENGER AND PROPERTY RATES

Prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act, no control
had been effected over the rates and fares charged by the commercial air carriers for the carriage of persons and property. Failure to regulate in this respect opened up a possibility of disastrous
rate wars and discriminatory practices like those which characterized the operations of the railroads in the colorful if somewhat
costly days of the "robber barons." However, it should be stated
here that the air carrier industry had been singularly free
from such corrupt and unprofitable practices, although there had
occurred some instances of uneconomic rate reductions in competitive situations- those airlines pursuing such a course hoping to recompense themselves for any losses incurred through
increased air mail compensation.!
The Civil Aeronautics Act filled this gap by placing within the
hands of the Board the power to regulate passenger and property
rates.
Each carrier was required to file with the regulatory body its
tariffs, which were to show all of its rates, fares, and charges.
Adherence to these tariffs was demanded and charges of greater
or lesser amounts than set forth therein were disallowed. All
rebates, refunds or remittances were prohibited.'
The granting of passes at free or reduced rates was strictly
5 See RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 107; also see Lupton, New Route Certificates
Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 12 Am L. Rav. 103 (1941).
6 § 403 (a) and (b).
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controlled.7 An Airline Pass Agreement' entered into by most of
the carriers fell within the purview of this clause. This agreement
provided that passes might be issued to certain described categories of persons, and forbade the honoring of passes issued by
any carrier not a signatory to the agreement. It also prohibited
the honoring of passes issued to any person not falling within
the categories of persons listed in the agreement. The Authority
came to the conclusion that the agreement did not violate the
terms of the Act. However, no opinion was offered as to whether
persons listed in the agreement to whom passes might be issued
fell within the categories set forth in Section 403 (b) of the Act. 9
It was not necessary to compare the classes of persons listed in the
agreement with those listed in the Act inasmuch as the parties did
not bind themselves to issue passes to the persons described. The
clause applicable in the agreement reads "may" issue, not "must"
issue. Therefore, a carrier may or may not issue as it chooses without creating contractual liability. This did not mean, however, that
the carriers were free to issue passes to persons falling outside the
list described in Section 403 (b). Furthermore, the granting of
passes at free or reduced fare to persons other than those described
in Section 403 (b) was not definitely prohibited as long as provision was made for such action in the published tariffs as required,
and provided such action did not violate Section 404 by granting
an unreasonable preference or undue advantage to any particular
person.
Any tariff change in rates, charges, and fares, or change in a
7 § 403 (b).

8 Airlines Pass Agreement, 1 C. A. A. 677 (1940).
9 § 403 (b) provides in part: "Nothing in this Act shall prohibit such air carriers, or
foreign air carriers, under such terms and conditions as the Authority may prescribe,
from issuing or interchanging tickets for free or reduced rate tansportation to their directors, officers, and employees and their immediate families; witnesses and attorneys
attending any legal investigation in which any such air carrier is interested; persons
injured in aircraft accidents and physicians and nurses attending such persons; and any
person or property with the object of providing relief in cases of general epidemics, pestilence or other calamitous visitation; and, in the case of overseas or foreign air transportation, to such other persons and under such other circumstances as the Authority
may by regulation prescribe."
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regulation or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge is prohibited unless thirty-day public notice is given, although the Board
may and does modify this procedure if it is deemed to be in the
public interest." In most cases where application for permission
to file tariffs in less than thirty days was requested, the carrier
wished to inaugurate promptly an authorized service or to correct
errors or inconsistencies discovered in existing tariffs." The carriers are also required to fie with the Board all joint rates, fares,
and charges for air transportation, 2 and maintain equitable divisions between air carriers participating therein so that none of the
participating carriers will be unduly preferred or prejudiced."
An affirmative duty is placed upon the carrier to provide reasonable through services, to maintain a safe and adequate service, and
to charge reasonable rates for the carriage of persons and property
in air transportation. 4 Reasonable rules, regulations, and practices
must be established 5 and discriminations or undue preference of
any person, locality or kind of traffic is forbidden.
In order to give added force to these provisions the Board has
the power, after notice and hearing, to prescribe rates whenever
it is of the opinion that such a rate is unjust or unreasonable
or unduly preferential;" to remove discriminations;' to suspend
rates;"' and to prescribe equitable divisions of joint rates, fares
or charges.2"
Broad rules were formulated which were to be followed in part
10 § 403 (c).
1 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIvIL AERONAUTCS AuTmoRTY, 8 (1940).

§ 403 (d).
Is § 404 (a).
4 Ibid.
12

15 Ibid.
18§ 404 (b).
171 1002 (d).
is § 1002 ().
191 1002 (g).
20 § 1002 (h).
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as a basis for determining fair and reasonable passenger and property rates.
1. "The effect of such rates upon the movement of traffic;
2. "The need in the public interest of adequate and efficient transportation of persons and property by air carriers at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service;
3. "Such standards respecting the character and quality of service to
be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed or pursuant to law;
4. "The inherent advantages of transportation by aircraft;
5. "The need of each air carrier for revenue sufficient to enable such
management, to procarrier, under honest, economical, and efficient
'
vid adequate and efficient air carrier service. 21

These rules and other provisions of the Act prescribe the governing principles, but an exact method of fixing such rates is not
provided for, leaving extensive discretionary powers to the Board
in deciding just what are fair and reasonable rates in the public
interest. It is to be noted that no mention is made in the Act of the
familiar due process rule of requiring a fair return on investment
or fair value of the property devoted to the service for the determination of rates. The Act places before the Board the five rules,
to be considered in conjunction with the other provisions, notably,
the Declaration of Policy, so that rates are to be fixed in order to,
bring about the maximum contribution to the development of an
air transportation system in accord with the public need of the
United States. It was felt that to have required a scheme of ratemaking based on a fair return of investment would have been
unsatisfactory, as not meeting the needs of the air carrier industry, for airlines in comparison with other utilities have few capitaI
goods. Their capital goods tend toward rapid obsolescence. Furthermore, the industry is subject to large fluctuations in traffic.
These facts make adherence to a fair-return-on-investment standard untenable. 2
1002 (e).
See Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1941).
The Supreme Court states at 586: "The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodiesto the service of any single formula or combination of formulas." It has been stated in
21 §
22
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For the most part there has been little direct control by the
Board in fixing rates for passengers and property; therefore, by
actual decisions, it is impossible to know with any accuracy the
factors which will enter into rate determination. Investigations
have been made to insure that rates and charges are reasonable
and non-discriminatory, but complaints as to unreasonableness
have been settled voluntarily by informal adjustment by the carrier concerned." The carriers, it would seem, have fixed their own
rates at a fair and reasonable level and in accordance with economic competitive principles to assure sufficiently reasonable
profits but not so high as to place an unreasonable burden on the
public, thus complying with the duty conferred upon them by
Section 404.
In one decision,2 ' however, the conclusion was reached that such
rates, in order to be reasonable and non-discriminatory to persons,
localities, and classes of traffic, were not required to be uniform
since such words as reasonable charges, unjust discrimination,
undue or unreasonable preference (as used in the Act) do not
imply uniformity. Here the Board made an investigation of the
legality of an Air Travel Card Plan which had been instituted by
various carriers in order to obtain traffic; this plan offered a discount of 15o less than standard one-way fares to frequent users
of air services who were eligible to subscribe. The Board found
the agreement to be reasonable, non-discriminatory, with no undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to subscribers in relation
to non-subscribers; consequently it felt that it should be considered
this regard: "Indeed to adopt the judicially ramified rule of fair return on fair value as
the sole standard of air transport rate-making would be disastrous. Capital investment
constitutes no safe criterion for as yet capital goods are few, quickly obsolescent and
subject to wide fluctuations. Congress was aware of this and prescribed a statutory standard remarkably close to observing the value of the services rendered to the public as the
true yardstick." Hamstra, "Two Decades-FederalAero Regulation in Perspective, 12
J. Am L. 105, 143 (1941).
2s See Neal, "Some Phases of Air Transport Regulation," 31 GEo. L. J. 355, 356 and
364 (1943).
24 Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C. A. B. 242 (1942).
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in the light of the reasonable welfare of the industry, the pro-

ducers, the shippers and the carriers.
"... it appears that there is no competitive relationship in the custom-

ary sense between the classes of traffic involved, that the reduced rates
are reasonably open to all, that the Plan constitutes a convenience and
benefit to a considerable part of the travelling public, that the interests
of the carriers are reasonably promoted, and that the difference in rates
is not clearly improperly adjusted with reference to the actual savings
and profit to the carrier from the Plan.''25
During the recent war, the Board undertook an investigation to
determine the legality of passenger rates maintained by the carriers and called upon them to show cause why such fares should
not be reduced in view of the fact that, due to certain wartime conditions, rates were believed to be excessive; the Board wished
these rates reduced 10o so as to restore the average passenger
revenue per revenue passenger mile to an approximate level existing previously to July 1, 1942. However, the carriers either

reduced the rates voluntarily or presented evidence that a reduction was not justified, and the proceedings were dismissed without
a formal decision." This investigation, however, indicates the vigilance with which the Board watches the rates and fares charged
and its desire, in the public interest, to lower fares when conditions become favorable.
A controversy of importance has recently arisen with respect
to air freight rates. 7 The disputants involved were certain certified air carriers, scheduled airlines, and a group of uncertified
air cargo carriers. The latter group had commenced the development of the carriage of freight by air after the termination of the
war. They had been permitted by the Board to transform their
contract services 28 into scheduled common carrier freight service
25

Id. at 251.

REPoRT oF THE CivI. AERONAUTICS BOARD, 14 (1943).
27Motions of Air Freight Forwarder Assoc., et al (C. A. B., Serial No. E-852, E-853)
2 C. C.H. Av. LAw REP. 21052 (1947).
28Those Air Carriers operating as contract carriers only, as distinguished from common carriers, are not considered to be within the Board's jurisdiction for air transporta26 ANNUAL
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to operate as such until a determination of their applications for
certificates of public convenience and necessity could be made. The
dispute concerned rates charged for the carriage of property by
air, freight as distinguished from express.
These two groups of carriers filed air freight tariffs, the certificated carriers filing tariffs in amounts below those previously filed
and the uncertificated cargo carriers filing tariffs which for the
most part were substantially ]ower still. The uncertificated carriers filed motions with the Board under Section 1002 (g) to suspend these reduced tariffs filed by the scheduled airlines. It was
alleged that such tariffs were unlawful inasmuch as they were
unduly discriminatory and unfair because they undercut the tariffs
filed by the cargo carriers. The contention was made that the
tariffs were unfair because the certificated airlines set their rates
below the cost of service and further that these airlines were in
a position to lower rates because their tariffs were based upon the
mail subsidy paid to them.
The Board refused to suspend and refuted the charges finding
little evidence presented of undercutting. In fact a finding was
made that undercutting which gives the public lower rates is not
in itself undesirable if unfair competition is not present even if
the lower rates are aimed specifically at certain air carriers.
As to the argument advanced that the certificated carriers were
rendering the service below cost, the Board was of the opinion
that there was not sufficient evidence available as to costs, and
even in the event such evidence were available it would not be
too material because air freight was in an experimental stage and
at such time "all industry goes through the experience of promotional rates-of rates initially set below costs but with costs falling below that rate if the hoped-for volume is attained." 9 Furthermore the variation in rates between the two groups of carriers
tion as defined means the transportation of the U. S. Mail or the carriage of persons or
property as a common carrier. Section 1 (10).
29 Motions of Air Freight Forwarder Assoc., et al, 2 C. C. H. Av. LAw REa.
1 21,
052.01, p. 16,262 (1947).
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was so small that a prima facie case of undue or unfair discrimination could hardly be spelled out.
The Board in rejecting the contention made with respect to the
fact that competition by the scheduled airlines was subsidized by
the United States Treasury stated that all but one of the airlines
involved were on a service rate which compensated solely for the
carriage of the mail and was not a subsidy. The remaining carrier, although a need carrier and receiving a subsidy to break
even on its operating cost, could not be considered as competing
through subsidy because the mail rate set for this carrier did not
provide for losses on air cargo operation.
Concluding that a prima facie case of unfair competition had
not been made out, but finding that the tariffs of all the air carriers involved showed little rationality of construction with respect
to sound principles of rate making, the Board ordered an investigation of rates of both certificated and uncertificated carriers.
The purpose of this investigation was stated to be the development of rational principles for the making of tariffs and also to
inquire into the validity of tariffs already filed. Following this
decision certain certificated carriers sought to reduce air freight
rates still further. Here the Board stepped in to suspend further
reductions for a period of 90 days at the petition of Slick Airways
and the Independent Air Freight Association. ° The Board believed
that the rate reductions were made by the carriers involved to further "what appears to them to be their own best interests."'" Since
the Board was conducting an investigation of rates and would not
know whether the rate reductions were lawful until such investigation was concluded, it believed further rate reductions should
cease during the pending investigation.
It was later determined that the air freight rates established
by the carriers were so low in relation to costs as to endanger the
further development of air freight on a sound and economic basis.
so Slick

Airways, Inc., et al-Air Freight Tariffs (Serial No. E.916) 2 C. C. H. Av.

LAw REP. E21063 (1947).
31 Ibid.
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Therefore a general minimum rate order applicable to the entire
industry was promulgated below which no air carrier could fix
its rates without approval of the Board. 2
By prescribing the minimum rate the Board aimed to limit the
possibilities of destructive competition and at the same time not
unduly restrict the continued growth of the air freight industry.
The minimum rate fixed by the Board's action was 16 cents per
ton mile covering the first 1,000 ton miles of any shipment, and
13 cents per ton mile covering the ton miles in excess of 1,000
for any shipment. These minimum freight rates were airport to
airport rates."3 Inasmuch as the Board did not wish to freeze rates
at the developmental stage of air freight it decided to keep the
proceeding open so that exemptions from the minimum might be
made in specific cases necessitated by the proper development of
air freight and in order to remove possible inequities and disparities.
Particular rates, rate structures or level of rates were not prescribed because the Board was of the opinion that it did not possess adequate information; that early action was necessary and
to set such rates would call for prolonged proceedings; and that
such rates might tend to be too restrictive in the developmental
period of air freight. The Board refused to consider value of
service in fixing its minimum rate since it believed that such was
important only in fixing rate structures. 4
In this decision it was indicated that promotional rates were
justified, but sanction was refused to such rates fixed with no
regard for costs. On the contrary rates must at all times be reasonably related to costs. It was stated:
"The test of reasonableness must include recognition of variations in
the ability of traffic to carry a full share of costs at different stages in
the development of that traffic, the effect of low rates in generating new
83Air Freight Rate Investigation (Serial No. E-1415) 2 C. C. H. Av. LAw REP.

121,104.01 .(1948).
33

Air Freight Rate Case, 2 C. C.H. Av. LAw REP.

",Ibid.

21,108 (1948).
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traffic and the resultant effect of increased volume of reductions in unit
costs."s5

The principle of charging lower rates for shipments of greater
distance was recognized as sound. With relation to costs, economies
are effected as the distance of shipment increases.
Following this decision the Board once again saw fit to suspend
airline tariffs. These tariffs involved reduced summer excursion
rates and were filed by Eastern, Delta, and National Airlines. The
traffic that these reduced fares might generate was conjectural and
since costs were rising generally, it was believed that such rates
might well have a detrimental financial effect upon the carriers."
At the outset and for years thereafter, the air carrier industry
was plagued with obstacles which had to be overcome in order to
obtain sufficient traffic. These obstacles in part consisted in the
public's hesitation and wariness in accepting this new form of
transportation and the disparity of air transportation rates when
compared with those of surface transport. However, in the past
few years, due to a number of reasons such as increased safety,
the great amount of publicity arising from the wartime utilization
of aviation, etc., the public has accepted air travel, and such
acceptance has brought increased traffic. This coupled with more
efficient equipment and other technological improvements, has permitted a reduction of rates on some routes to the level of Pullman
fares." It is still too early to forecast what such fares will be in
relation to surface transport, but the rates charged for air carriage will to a large extent determine the place air travel will
occupy in the national transport picture, and such will assuredly
be borne in mind in any fixing of such rates. As the Board has
Q0 often stated in its air mail rate determinations, it is concerned
35 Air Freight Rate Investigation, 2 C. C. H. Av. LAw REP. 21,104.03 (1948).
S Delta Air Lines Inc. [Complaint & Petition to Suspend Tariffs] (Serial No.
E-1669) 2 C. C. H. Av. LAW REP. 121,110 (1948).
37 See Tipton. Air Transportation and Free Enterprise, as included in VITAL PROBLEMS OF Am COmMEcE, edited by Zacharoff, 76 (1946). The domestic carriers increased
their passenger fares approximately 10% in 1947. ANNUAL REPORT OF TliE CIVIL AnaNAuTncs BOARD, 14 (1947).
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with the fixing of a rate which will assure the property development of an air transportation system in the interest of the nation's
commerce, its general security, and its Postal Service.
AIR MAIL RATES

The Civil Aeronautics Board is empowered and directed to fix
fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the carriage by air
of the mail,38 but unlike former air mail legislation, which bound
its predecessor in interest, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in fixing such rates, uncompromising and absolute rules are not
ordained. Competitive bidding and the letting of air mail contracts
thereunder are abolished; the Act requires all airlines to carry
the air mail when requested to do so by the Postmaster General,
provided authorization is granted in the certificate of public convenience and necessity. Compensation is paid from Post Office
Department appropriations after a fair and reasonable rate is
determined by the Board.3"
Certain broad rate-making elements are prescribed for consideration by the Board in determining fair and reasonable air mail
rates; among other factors to be considered is the need of the air
carrier for compensation sufficient to insure the satisfactory performance of the mail service.
". and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable
such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management to
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the
extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of
the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense." 40

This latter clause indicates that the purpose motivating the Act
was not only to regulate but to foster the air carrier industry, and
it also demonstrates congressional awareness of the perilous financial condition existing in the industry at the time of the Act's
passage, such financial condition being caused to a large degree
38 §406 (a) and (b).
3o § 406 (a).
40; 406 (b).
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by the lack of sufficient revenues which seriously hampered the
maintenance and development of commercial aviation.41 Congress,
recognizing the fact that few, if any, of the airlines could long
survive without mail compensation, enacted Section 406 (b)
quoted in part above. By the terms of this section it is apparent
that compensation for the carriage of mail by aircraft goes beyond
mere payment for the mail services and provides for the payment
of a subsidy through such compensation, whenever and as long
as the carriers do not derive sufficient revenue from their commercial activities, passenger and express services, to enable them
to operate at a reasonable profit. Thus, in order to permit of the
maintenance and development of an air transportation system in
accordance with the recognized needs of the nation and the public
interest, deficiencies in revenues from passenger and express services are to be made up through mail payments. 2
The Civil Aeronautics Board is granted large discretionary
powers in the fixing of air mail rates conforming with certain
broad standards of "need";"2 these standards depart from the
common judicial norm of a minimum-due-process base, which
establishes as the test for fair and reasonable rates the covering
of costs incident to providing the particular service plus a fair
return on the investment utilized in rendering the service. The Act
in defining a carrier's need goes beyond any such barely compensatory rate minimum and enjoins not only payments for the
mail service but also the payment of substantial amounts to cover
deficits from passenger and express services."
41 Pan American Airways (of Del.) (Trans-Atlantic Mail Rates) 1 C. C. A. 220, 253
(1939).
42 Chicago & Southern Airlines (Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 8 and 53) 3 C. A. B. 161
(1941). It is said at 188: "The Interstate Commerce Committee of both houses of Congress were well aware of the potential subsidy features of the 'need' provision in Section
406 (b), when the Act was being considered in bill form." Also see Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 54 (1939) where the Authority outlined the policy

with respect to air mail rates.
43 Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 54 (1939) ; Continental Air
Lines (Mail Rates for Route No. 43), 1 C. A. A. 182, 188 (1939).
44 Pan American Airways (of Del.) (Trans-Atlantic Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 220, 252
(1939) ; Pan American Airways Co. (of Nev.) (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 385, 408 (1939).
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The Board in its early cases was confronted in each instance by
situations whereby the carriers were sustaining considerable losses
from their commercial ventures before air mail pay. In these
instances the body was, therefore, concerned with the fixing of air
mail rates by determining the unfavorable balance between operating expenses and passenger and property revenues. The legitimate deficits incurred in the operations were ascertained and provision was made therefor. Thus, air mail payments sufficient to
meet these deficits at a break-even level and an additional sum to
assure a reasonable profit to the carrier were granted.
From the outset when the Board assumed its duties under the
Act, it has directed its policies with respect to air mail compensation toward the development of an air transportation system conforming to the national objectives expressed. It has striven to
expedite the attainment of economic stability so that dependency
upon the government for air mail compensation in such sums as
to amount to a subsidy might be eliminated. 4
A. Honest, Efficient, and Economical Management.
In gauging an air carrier's need for mail compensation, the
Board is called upon to analyze past and forecast future operating
expenses, direct and indirect, in the light of the carrier's honest,
economical, and efficient management." This is required by statutory mandate. Costs occasioned by mismanagement are excluded
from computations relative to air mail compensation." Such a
policy of determining need on a basis of honest, economical and
efficient management recognizes and permits benefits to flow to the
carrier exercising managerial efficiency, and on the other hand
deters unreasonable expenses resulting from uneconomic management by disallowing the costs incident thereto in calculating mail
45 Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 55 (1939); Pan American
Airways Co. (of Del.) (Trans-Atlantic Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 220, 254 (1939).
46 See FirST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY, 21 (1939).
'TMid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 49 (1939).
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rates. A vigorous and stimulating incentive is thereby prompted."'
In surveying managerial practices, consideration is taken of a
carrier's "capital structure, its methods of financing and the results
of its operations, its particular operating problems, and the efforts
of the management toward their solution."4 The Board scrutinizes
the reasonableness of expenditures and costs, inquiring closely
into carrier managerial policy in the course of its decisions.
Examples are here considered.
The prediction of a mail rate upon an unreasonably high estimate of traffic and advertising expense has been disallowed; and
where expenditures for this item may be justified from a developmental aspect, continuance of such expenditures is reasonable only
if experience indicates a profitable return will be provided therefrom."0
A carrier's action in retiring preferred stock to the extent of
100% of the actual investment recognized at the time of its issuance and in paying of dividends from the sum derived from the
sale of one of its air mail contracts was thought most unwise, especially since the carrier's working capital was depleted and no provision had been made to meet a federal income tax liability.
The Authority decided that the carrier, immediately after such
poor managerial judgment, should not succeed in showing "need"
with respect to another of its air mail operations. 1
The installation of larger and more expensive equipment is a
matter left to the managerial judgment of the carrier, but the use
of such equipment is only justified if it improves the economic
position of the airline and serves the interests of commerce, the
national defense, and the Postal Service as prescribed. The vol4s Id. at 55; Continental Airlines (Mail Rates for Route No. 43), 1 C. A. A. 182, 188
(1939) ; Inland Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 155, 157 (1939).
4. Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 50 (1939) ; Pan American Airways (of Nev.) (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 385, 390 (1939).
50 Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 45, 52 (1939).

51Inland Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 155,163 (1939).
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tume of traffic accruing therefrom should be sufficient to support
the added expense."
Where depreciation charges have been estimated by a carrier
at an excessive figure, the Board has determined air mail compensation only to an extent confirmed by "experience with the type
of equipment to be used.""8 Increases of salaries to airlines' officers
not believed to be warranted have been excluded from calculations.54 Although the Board's policy is not one of disapproving
experimentation in reduced passenger and express fares in order
to attract additional traffic and to improve the economic position
of the industry, any such modifications that are unreasonable
reflect upon the efficiency of management."
Expenses incident to the development of new routes or the extension of existing routes are to be included within air mail compensation, although the carrier has the burden of proving the reasonableness and the purpose of such expenses, and if the carrier does
not present sufficient data to permit of a finding of the reasonableness, their consideration will be excluded for rate-making
purposes.5"
A petitioner contended in an air mail rate case that the Board
had not taken cognizance of the honesty, economy and efficiency
of its management in fixing its air mail rates; that greater incomes
had been allowed through air mail compensation for carriers
whose operations, while comparable from the standpoint of scope
and type of equipment utilized, were conducted at a higher cost
than the petitioner's. The Board retorted:
"It is, however, difficult to make any absolute comparison between
operations of air carriers subject to our. jurisdiction because of the existence of varying factors which influence both revenues and expenses.
52

Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates for Route No. 48), 2 C. A. B. 392, 397 (1940);

Continental Airlines (Mail Rates--Routes Nos. 29 and 43), 2 C. A. B. 683, 689 (1941).
53 Braniff Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 353, 356 (1939).
54 Id. at 363.
55 Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), I C. A. A. 275, 283 (1939).
56 Pa. Central Airlines Corp. (Mail Rates), 4 C. A. B. 22, 33-35 (1942). Also see
A "UAL R'oirr OF THE Crvm AmONAUTICS BoAMU, 18 (1943).
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Differences in the territory through which the carriers operate, the volume of traffic handled, and' the revenues per mile accrued are all factors
which bear upon the cost." 7
It must be noted that it is not the intention of Congress or the
Board functioning under the Act to superimpose governmental
management upon the airlines. 5 An inquiry is made into the carriers' managerial policy as it is clear that the government does not
wish to assume the burden of mismanagement, and the carriers
acting either on their own initiative or under the direction of the
Board, within the limits of its jurisdiction, must establish a managerial policy which produces the greatest benefit to the public
interest from public monies expended. The Board has expressed
itself to the effect that such an inquiry is...

not for the purpose of invading proper managerial discretion, (of

the carriers) but with the object of encouraging a progressive, efficient
management which will be characterized by a constant effort to in.
crease commercial revenues, thereby resulting in the attainment of an
increasing measure of commercial self-sufficiency. ' "
B. Services Allowable.
The Act departs from the narrow concept established by prior
legislation which disallowed in the calculation of air mail compensation the inclusion of losses from schedules and routes upon
which the air mail was not carried."s In the fixing of air mail compensation to cover losses from non-mail schedules, it has been
stated that the language of Section 406 (b) manifestly included
a consideration of such schedules as well as designated mail operations in computing rates; and that deficits would be made up if
these non-mail schedules were operated under an honest, economical and efficient management and moreover were justified by the
requirements of commerce and the national defense.
07 Braniff Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates Proceeding), 2 C. A. B. 555, 582 (1941).
58 Mid-Continent Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. C. A. 45, 49 (1939).
59FIRST ANNUAL REPoRT OF TIM Civn. AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY, 21 (1939).
60 Pa. Central Airlines Corp. (Mail Rates) 1 C. A. A. 436,446 (1939).
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"It becomes necessary to consider the total number of schedules operated by petitioner in the light of the requirements of commerce and of
the national defense.
"In determining the mail rates herein, allowance is made not only for
the expenses and revenues incident to the operation of schedules required solely in the interests of the Postal Service, but also for the
expenses and revenues incident to the operation of all additional schedules found to be required in the interests of commerce or the national
defense, or both."'"

On the other hand, cost arising from non-mail schedules in
excess of the above requirements are outside the pale and are
excluded from all compensatory considerations.

"

As all expenses and revenues from schedules required by the
interests of commerce or the national defense are considered in
determining the amount of mail compensation to fulfill the carriers' need, no added expense accrues to the Post Office Department if all schedules so blanketed by the Board in its computations are designated for air mail carriage, and in such instances
the Postmaster General designates as an air mail schedule any
schedule so considered by the Board in its calculations. This
results in definite benefits to the Postal Service by providing for
more frequent mail service.63
In its determinations of governmental support through air mail
compensation of these non-mail schedules, the Board speaks of
measuring the requirements of commerce-whether or not the
schedule is required in the interests of commerce as determined
by the "response made by commerce to the service as offered."'"
81 United Airlines, Inc., Transport Corp. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 752, 754 (1940).
62 It has been said in this respect: "It is equally clear that non-pay mail operations in
excess of such requirements (Commerce of the U. S., Postal Service, and National
Defense) are to be excluded from consideration in the determination of the rate. It is
impossible to accept a concept of rate determination which would result in a blanket
assumption by the Government of losses resulting from the operation of non-pay mail
mileage, and would leave to the sole discretion of the carrier the determination of the
amount of such mileage that should be flown. The Act does not contemplate any such
consequence." Northwest Airlines (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 275, 279-280 (1939).
6s United Air Lines, Inc., Transport Corp. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 752, 754 (1940).
64 Braniff Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 353, 361 (1939) ; Northwest Air.
lines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 275, 283 (1939).
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This appraisal suggests a determination of the public need relative to the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, but it is not to be confused with such a proceeding and
is to be distinguished from it. Here the consideration and appraisal
of the volume of traffic goes to the allowance or disallowance of
non-mail schedules only as far as the determination of air mail
rates is concerned. It does not involve the disallowance of operations over any schedule whose expenses are not included in mail
compensation. Such continued operation lies within the discretion
of the carrier, just as does the discontinuances of any schedule
which the carrier feels not to be justified. However, in order to
discontinue any schedule designated as a mail schedule permission must first be obtained from the Postmaster General. Furthermore, any discontinuance of schedules is always subject to the
carrier's duty to continue to furnish adequate services to points
named in its certificate."
The Board has dealt with cases arising where exclusive passenger and property routes, as distinguished from schedules, were
operated by a carrier, such routes not being designated by the
Postmaster General as mail schedules. These exclusively commercial routes are treated in the same way as non-mail schedules.
This is illustrated by the Chicago and Southern A rlines rate case.8"
There, the carrier requested that an allowance be made in air mail
computation not only for route A, which was designated by the
Postmaster General as an air mail schedule, but also for route B
which was limited to the transportation of persons and property
only, although authorization had been granted by the Board to
transport mail over the route. The Postmaster General intervened
and contended that even though route B had been certificated for
the- transportation of mail and was therefore available to the mail
service, such action created no duty on the part of the Post Office
Department to compensate for any part of the operating expenses
65 United Air Lines, Inc., Transport Corp. (Mail Rates), 1 C. A. A. 752, 762 (1940).

6
6 Chicago &Southern Air Lines, Inc. (Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 8 and 53), 3 C. A.
B. 161, 190 (1941).
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of that route. The issue then presented was whether or not the
Board could cover operating costs by mail compensation on a route
devoted to exclusive commercial services in fixing rates for the
transportation of mail over the entire system. The Board reasoned
that the Act prescribed no narrow route concept, but to the contrary
authorized and permitted such inclusions.
"The new act of 1938 discarded the route concept and established in
its place the air carrier as the primary unit around which the national
air transportation system was to be developed through the instrumentality of air mail compensation.... The 'need' is that of the air carrier
as a whole and not that of any particular geographical division of its
operations."'"
Therefore, any route or segment certificated is to be supported
if serving the needs of commerce or the national defense and the
Board is not confined to a consideration solely of revenues and
expenses upon routes on which air mail alone is transported. This
interpretation led to the fixing of rates of compensation based upon
the carriers' systems as a whole and thus eliminated much of the'
detail previously involved, by doing away with the necessity of
fixing rates for individual routes."8
In the earlier cases the mail rate was, for the most part, fixed
at a base rate of cents per airplane mile for the first 300 pounds
or fraction thereof, plus a percentage of this base rate for each
additional 25 pounds of mail or fraction thereof on schedules
upon which the mail was transported, such rate to be applied to
direct airport-to-airport mileage as the basis for computation.
Later the Board in order to enable the Post Office Department
to use certain non-mail schedules, modified its air mail orders so
as to provide for an automatic rate adjustment by fixing rates on
a sliding scale. Non-mail schedules operated by the carriers which
had not been considered by the Board in computing its rate of
mail compensation could not be utilized by the Post Office Depart67Ibid.
(sAmerican Airlines, Inc. (Mail. Rates), 3 C. A. B. 323, 342 (1942).
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ment for air mail carriage unless the carrier was compensated for
any additional mail mileage at the existing mail rate. This brought
about inconveniences for, although the mail service as provided
by the designated air mail schedules might be adequate, still,
benefits would accrue to the Postal Service if these non-mail
schedules were available for the carriage of air mail. The carriers would also benefit, in many instances, for the use of nonmail schedules would allow for the spreading of the mail load
over additional schedules and obviate the necessity at times of
limiting the space available for other types of traffic. The Board
then ordered a sliding rate scale which would permit the use of
such schedules without substantially changing the total amounts
paid to the carrier. 9
C. Earnings and Return on Investment.
Attention has been given herein to the granting of amounts
through air mail compensation in order to make up operating deficits at a break-even level. But in addition to break-even amounts
the carrier is entitled to a reasonable profit. 0 There is no rigid
criterion in establishing the reasonableness of profits as variances
ensue with respect to differing times and conditions. Earnings may
be unreasonably high or unreasonably low for certain periods of
time, but the standard of fair and reasonable rates is complied
with if "the average earnings over a reasonably extended period
reach a fair level."' In providing return to the carriers, the Board
s Id. at 357. "This automatic variation will be accomplished in accordance with the
principles laid down in the show-cause orders issued by the Board on February 19, 1942,
with respect to all existing rate orders, by varying the base rate of payment per mile
flown with mail in inverse proportion to the ratio of the average daily schedule mileage
represented by schedules actually designated by the Postmaster General for the carriage
of mail to the base mileage established in the order; and by varying the base poundage,
from its normal figure of 300 pounds, in the same ratio."
See also THE ANNUAL REPoRT OF THE CrvEL AERONAUTICS BOARD, 25, 26 (1942) and
Braniff Airways, Inc. (Automatic Rate Adjustment), 3 C. A. B. 420 (1942).
70 Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates-Routes Nos. 26 and 48), 3 C. A. B. 464,
472 (1942) ; Inland Air Lines, Inc. (Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 28 and 35), 3 C. A. B.
491,498 (1940).
71 Braniff Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates--Routes Nos. 9, 15 and 50) ; 3 C. A. B. 633, 636
(1942).
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has stressed the recognition of efficiency so as to provide an incentive and impulse toward self-sufficiency and thereby reduce airline
dependency upon the government. 2
As indicated earlier, the Board, in the great majority of cases,
has refused to apply the usual rule of a fair return on the investment or property utilized in the transportation services as a basis
for rate determination. The Act does not subscribe to any such
method of rate compensation and the Board has departed from
this orthodox test in the fixing of air mail compensation." The
matter was first discussed in the Trans-Atlantic mail rate case
when Pan American Airways sought to earn an annual return of
10% on all its claimed investment. This was rejected by the
Board. A minimum compensatory rate as prescribed by the Constitution would call only for a return on that part of the carrier's
investment devoted to the mail service and under such a standard,
an allocation of costs between the different services-mail on the
one hand and commercial services on the other-would have been
necessary. The Civil Aeronautics Act, in prescribing a fair and
reasonable rate, recognizes the need of the carrier for added
finances to cover costs and to provide a fair return on all services;
and the carriers cannot be heard to complain that a rate is noncompensatory and denies due process when it is in excess of the
minimum. The Board refused to apply the standard of a fair
return upon the fair value of the property used and useful in the
public service, as it believed such a standard to be economically
and administratively unsound and one that has plagued and burdened other regulatory agencies in its application." Nevertheless,
the Board has held that a reasonable return on the carrier's entire
investment used and useful for its transport services is one factor,
among others, to be considered as to the reasonableness of allow72 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, inc. (Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 8 and 53), 3 C. A.
B. 161, 190 (1941 j.
73Pan American Airways (of Del.) (Trans-Atlantic Mail Rates), I C. A. A. 220,
253 (1939).
74 See ANNTl. REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOAr", 17 (1943).
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able profit."' A rate of return upon the actual legitimate investment is one item for consideration in deciding the net income to
be permitted to the carrier, and weight is given to the funds legitimately devoted to the enterprise by the owners in determining the
reasonableness of air mail rates. But the Board is not bound by
any fixed rate base determined by cost of reproduction, going
concern on investment, or other similar standards.
"A specified return on a carrier's investment which would enable that
carrier to earn an amount sufficient to cover its capital cost would not be

an inflexible measure of the fair and reasonable rate contemplated by
the Civil Aeronautics Act; it would, however, constitute significant and
into account in connection with the detervaluable evidence to be taken
7

mination of such rates."

Other facts have been listed which offer evidence of the reasonableness of 'rates, for example "the relationship which the carrier's profit bears to its total revenue,""' and "the ratio between
the carrier's investment and the volume of service rendered."'"
Moreover, "the susceptibility of the industry to large and unpredictable fluctuations of net operating income" is an element for
consideration in reaching a conclusion regarding a fair rate."
It should be noted that during the war, and as the Board
stated, solely because of wartime conditions, a fair return on
investment became, in some cases, the determining factor in providing for net operating income. However, the language of the
decisions makes it clearly apparent that they are not to be taken
as precedent inasmuch as the Board was looking toward future
peacetime conditions when the incentives to develop the greatest
possible commercial services would again be effective.
T5American Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C.A. B. 323, 337 (1942).
76Ibid; American Airlines (Mail Rates on Rehearing), 3 C. A. B. 770, 789 (1942).
7T American Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 323, 337 (1942).
isIbid.

T9Delta Air Corp. (Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 24 and 54), 3 C-A. B. 261, 285
(1942).
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"... in that future period the net earnings of such carriers as are in any
degree dependent upon Government-support should again be established to reward carriers that display exceptional initiative in increasing the volume of their service and in improving the relation between
the volume of service rendered and the amount of capital employed." 80

It has further been determined that although the Act is broad
in its implications relative to the development of air transportation, it was not the intention of Congress to provide, through air
mail funds capital for the carriers' expansion other than incidentally, by providing a profit to the carriers which would serve to
attract capital from private sources sufficient to meet their needs.8"
D. Retroactive Mail Rates and "Recapture."
The Board is empowered, after fixing fair and reasonable air
mail rates, "to make such rates effective from such date as it shall
determine to be proper."82 This provision was the cause of heated
controversy in the "recapture" decisions.
* A considerable amount of time usually elapses between the institution of proceedings in air mail compensation cases and the date
on which the order is issued, and during such time mail payments
continue. The question then arises whether the old or the new rate
shall be effective during the pendency of the proceeding. The
Board, under its power to make the rate retroactive, concluded
that the rate should take effect at the time the petition was filed.
This procedure was well and good with no challenges of such retroactive rate-making as long as the rate of mail pay was increased
in each instance. But in the American A4irlines case"' a substantial
period of time had elapsed during the pendency of the case and
during this period increased volume of traffic had rendered the
carrier a sizeable profit. The Board found these earnings to be
an excessive return-a profit to the carrier in excess of that which
80 Pan American Grace Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 550, 590 (1942);
Northeast Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rate Route No. 27), 4 C.A. B. 181, 189 (1943).
81 American Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 323, 333 (1942).
8 § 406 (a).
811American Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 323, 333 (1942).
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might reasonably have been anticipated if fair and reasonable
rates had been fixed at the beginning of the case. Therefore, a
refund to the Government was in order-a sum of some $4,000,000
in this case alone. The Board determined that if air mail rates
are not reasonable, but in fact greater than the revenues necessary
to enable the carrier under honest, economical and efficient management to maintain and continue the development of air transportation pursuant to the mandate of the statute, such excesses
should be scaled down to a reasonable level, the new rate made
retroactive to the date of the institution of the proceeding, and
the government thus allowed to "recapture."
In later "recapture" decisions"4 the Board modified this order
and also reversed its decision as to American Airlines, although
it reiterated its power to reduce rates and make them retroactive.
In these cases it found that such retroactive rates calling for
refunds to the government would be inconsistent with the public
interest due to the harmful effect of such a policy upon the carrier during wartime conditions. It was also believed that the
carriers would need reserves on hand to provide for possible
pressing financial requirements after the war's end.
Although it decided not to enforce retroactive rates in these
cases, the Board did place restrictions upon the use of these excess
earnings where the carriers were not yet self-sufficient It was said
that the monies were to serve the public need for air transportation and should be reinvested in the transportation service and
were not to be devoted to the personal needs of the stockholders
through dividend payments." Moreover, until the carrier's operations were self-sufficient, these excess earnings were not to be considered as a part of its investment for the purposes of permitting
a return thereon in mail rate determination. The Board said:
8

4 Pan American Grace Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 550 (1942); Pan
American Airways, Inc. (Latin American Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 657 (1942); American
Airlines, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 770, 776 (1942).
8
5 Pan American Grace Airways, Inc. (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 550, 565 (1942).
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"So long as the respondent's rates are based upon its financial needs
in excess of a compensatory return, it is in no position to assert an
equitable or legal claim for such a profit upon capital thus derived.
Only when the company attains a commercially self-sustaining status
and is paid for the carriage of the mail upon the basis of compensation
for such service will the Board regard it as entitled to earn a return upon
that part of its investment which had its source in excessive mail pay8
ments."s

E. Seli-Suficiency of Carriersand the Determination of Air Mail
Rates.
Through increased volume of commercial traffic, several airlines found themselves in a prosperous financial condition toward
the close of World War II. The return from passenger and express
services yielded these lines sufficient revenue to meet their operating deficits not only at a break-even level but also in amounts adequate to insure substantial profits. The Board was then confronted
with the problem of fixing mail rates to cover only those costs
incident to the operation of the mail service and to provide a reasonable profit upon that part of the carrier's investment used and
useful for that service alone for, as the carrier had reached selfsufficiency, an amount necessary to meet deficits of revenue in
passenger and property services was no longer required.
It therefore became necessary to allocate costs and investment
devoted to the mail service separately from that devoted to passenger and property services. All expenses attributable to the commercial services alone, such as expenses for airport passenger
and ticket agents, consolidated ticket office expenses, expenses for
traffic and advertising, and the like, were allocated to commercial
services. Other operating expenses were allocated to both mail
86 Id. at 566 in relation to this problem of "recapture" see two editorials 'Recapture'
Air Mail Pay for American Airlines, 13 J. Am L. 140 (1942); Afore About 'Recapture'
Air Mail Pay, 13 J. Am L. 321 (1942).
The Board has determined it has no legral authority to fix rates retroactively for a
period during which a final rate has been in effect, where such final rate has not been
challenged by the introduction of a revisionary mail rate proceeding. See Pa. Central
Airlines Corp. (Mail Rates) and TWA, Inc. (Mail Rates) (Serial Nos. E-1032 and
E-1033), 2 C. C. H. Av.. LAw REP. 121,072 (1947).
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and commercial services "on the basis of the ratio existing between
the pound-miles of mail service and the pound-miles of commercial service rendered."87 In determining such a minimum rate, the
carrier is also entitled to a reasonable profit or return on investment devoted to the mail service, so it was necessary to make an
allocation in this respect also. This allocation was carried out on
the same basis. The Board, in basing its determination on a weight
allocation, fully recognized that certain other methods might also
be employed to reflect costs, such as the space used, etc. It was
not rigid in its viewpoint here, stating that no method of allocation
could be depended upon to represent an absolute science, and in
fixing its rate, account was taken of the uncertainties and fallibilities involved in this method of cost allocation.
The rate fixed of .3 mills per pound mile. or 60 cents per ton
mile goes beyond a minimum compensatory rate. The Board said
there were other reasons present why the rates could be fixed in
excess of the minimum.
1. "No serious governmental financial problem would result if the mail
rate is somewhat higher than the minimum.. . because the United
States through the Post Office Department receives more from users of
mail service than is paid by the United States through the Post Office
Department to this carrier by way of compensation.
2. "There are various operating practices imposed on account of the
mail service which are not adantageous to the passenger service.
3. "Comparison of earnings on the basis of a common denominator of
service is an accepted standard in measuring transportation rates....
There is no support on the present record, however, and no sound reason now apparent for a conclusion that earnings under a rate which
respondent has no power to initiate for a service which it is required to
perform should be substantially less than its reasonable earnings from

other traffic.
4. "It is only reasonable that the mail should continue to aid even a
self-sufficient carrier in a trend which can be expected to result in
F Eastern Airlines (Mail Rates), 3 C. A. B. 733, 753 (1942). This problem is discussed fully therein.
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greater revenues from non-mail sources and thus on the weight basis
of allocation in further decrease in the mail costs."""

In 1945 the four largest domestic mail carriers were placed on
a service rate of 45 cents per ton mile. The rate was made uniform
since there was an overall similarity of costs and operating patterns of the carriers involved, and the setting of such uniform
rates would provide, it was believed, incentives for economy and
efficiency. 8"

Airline self-sufficiency from commercial services has of course
been the aim of the Civil Aeronautics Board from the beginning.
The volume of passenger traffic has grown astoundingly."0 From
1942 through 1945 the revenues of many airlines from commercial services were sufficient to cover costs and provide profits so
that mail rates could be based upon amounts sufficient to provide
a reasonable return for the rendering of the mail service only.
The goal of the Board seemed to have been attained. This public
acceptance of air transportation produced rosy optimism, and high
estimates of ever-increasing volumes of traffic were made. However, during the last half of the year 1946, the volume of traffic
declined sharply due in part to a series of very disastrous airplane crashes here and abroad. Operating costs are up and in some
quarters it is thought that the airlines have purchased an excessive number of aircraft and also in other respects have overexpanded too quickly. In any event, through a combination of
factors, the sixteen domestic trunk lines suffered great losses in
88 Id. at 757-759.

89 Eastern Air Lines, Mail Rate, 6 C. A. B. 551 (1945); American Airlines, Mail
Rate, 6 C. A. B. 567 (1945) ; United Air Lines, Mail Rate, 6 C. A. B. 581 (1945) ; TWA,
Mail Rate, 6 C.A. B. 595 (1945).
00 See Chart, Operating Revenues and Expenses, Mileages and Traffic Statistics for
the fiscal year 1940 through 1945 included within the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTiCS BOARD (1945), Appendix D, 28. It is shown there that the total miles
flown by domestic carriers in 1940 was 99,473,678 as compared with 186,244,384 in 1945;
number of revenue passengers in 1940, 2,240,023-in 1945, 5,137,877; and pound miles
of express in 1940, 5,989,693,788-45,191,644,447 in 1945. For articles pertaining to the
subject of air mail rates see Neal supra note 23 and Altschul, supra note 2.
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1946 and 1947.91 As a consequence of losses there has been a
clamoring for higher mail rates.
In April 1948 the Board offered increased air mail rates to the
five largest domestic carriers. This action was taken in order to
give the unsubsidized service rate air carriers additional mail compensation to meet increased operating costs and lower load factors. The formula designed was based on a uniform service rate;
block rates were set, beginning at 75 cents a ton mile for the first
2,500 ton miles of mail per day, declining 5 cents per block until
40 cents is reached for the block, 30,000 and over ton miles of
mail per day."2
The fixing of mail rates for the feeder airlines has also occupied
the attention of the Board. Certain carriers of this short haul, local
service type were granted certificates of public convenience and
necessity to operate in air transportation. Therefore it became
necessary to prescribe a mail rate based upon a "need" standard
inasmuch as the feeder airlines were and are not self-sufficient.
In the Pioneer Airlines case a sliding incentive basis was adopted
by which a maximum rate was fixed to decline when the passenger
load factor rises above a minimum. Under such an arrangement
net revenues will increase as the carrier develops its non-mail air
traffic."
BUSINESS PRACTICES

The Civil Aeronautics Act rounds out its economic control of
the air carrier industry by providing authority to regulate the busi91 See Survival in the Air Age, a Report by the President's Air Policy Commission,
99 (1948) where it is stated that the domestic airlines lost approximately $22,000,000 in
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947. See also the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CiviL AERoNAUTICS BOARD, 9 (1947).
92 Tentative Findings and Conclusions in the "Big 5" Mail Rate Case, Serial Nos.
E-1351-55 (March 29, 1948). See also Aviation Week v. 48, No. 16, p. 14 (April 19,
1948) ; Aviation Week v. 48, No. 17, p. 37 (April 26, 1948).
93 Pioneer Airlines Inc. (Mail Rates) (C. A. B. Docket No. 2002, July 2, 1947)
2 C. C. H. Av. LAW REP. 1 21,038 (1947). See also, THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD, 11 (1947). A sliding scale mail rate has been applied to trunk line
carriers also. Continental Air Lines Inc. (Mail Rates) (Docket No. 2682, Serial No.
E-1072, Dec. 19, 1947) ; Braniff Airways, Inc. (Serial No. E-2129) 2 C. C. H. Av. LAW
REP. IT2129 (1948) ; Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Serial No. E-2130) 2 C. C. H. Av. LAW REP.
121130 (1948).
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ness practices of the airlines. The Board is empowered to regulate
the air carrier's accounting methods;94 consolidations, mergers,
and acquisitions of control;95 interlocking relationships;" loans;"
methods of competition;" and agreements between carriers."°
Under these sections of the statute the issues of competition and
monopoly become of vast significance. In those proceedings where
certificates of public convenience and necessity are requested, the
regulatory body is interested in limiting the number of air carriers in the field of air transportation to prevent wasteful and
uneconomic competition in the form of needless duplication of
routes. Here, the problem becomes one bearing on the prevention
of those close interrelationships between the carriers themselves
which lead to consolidations of economic power which might suppress competition in such a manner as to retard the development
of air transportation in contravention of the public interest.
A. Consolidations,Mergers, and Acquisitions of Control.
Consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control by air carriers, common carriers and air carriers, or any person engaged in
any phase of aeronautics are prohibited by the Act and made
unlawful unless approval is granted therefor by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Board is to approve such practices after notice
and hearing and a finding that they are consistent with the public
interest. However, its discretion is severely restricted inasmuch as
94 § 407.
5 § 408 (a) and (b).
96 § 409 (a).
7§ 410.
98 § 411.
99§ 412 (a) and (b). Other sections relative to business practice are: 409 (b) which
makes it unlawful for an officer or director of an air carrier to receive profit from the
sale of securities issued by the carrier; Section 414 which empowers the Board to exempt
any air carrier from the anti-trust laws when necessary to do so in order to comply with
the Board's orders under Sections 408, 409, and 412; Section 415 which grants authority
to inquire into air carrier management; Section 416 (a) confers authority to classify air
carriers into groups and to make reasonable rules to be observed by each class or group;
and Section 416 (b) which provides power to exempt air carriers from the provisions of
Title IV or any regulation made thereunder which would unduly burden the carrier.
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it is governed by a proviso to Section 408 (b) stating that it shall
not approve
"... any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or
acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or
monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air
carrier not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control."
There are, then, two paramount problems to be decided in these
1 °°
cases.
1. Is the proposed merger or consolidation within the public
interest?
2. Will the proposed merger or consolidation result in a monopoly and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another carrier
not a party thereto?
In regard to the first problem, the Board is guided in its decisions by those standards prescribed in the Declaration of Policy,
which are equally applicable to cases involving applications for
certificates of convenience and necessity. A balanced competition
is to be maintained in air transportation to the extent required for
the attainment of the stated objectives: the development of an air
transportation system to meet the present and future needs of the
commerce of the country, the national defense, and the Postal
Service; any acquisition of control of one air carrier by another
tending to stifle competition so as to hinder such development is
adjudged detrimental to the public interest. 1 '
In its first acquisition of control case, the Board was
the problem of a proposed merger and its prospective
of competition. There, approval was sought to effectuate
of Western Air Express with United Airlines.0 2 It was

faced with
restraining
the merger
shown that

100 United Airlines Transport Corp. and Western Air Express Corp.-Interchange of
Equipment, 1 C. A. A. 723, 728 (1940).
101 United Airlines Transport Corp.-Acquisition of Western Air Express, 1 C. A. A.
739,745 (1940).
102

Ibid.
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certain definite advantages in the public interest would accrue if
the merger were approved; however, these advantages were not of
sufficient weight to offset the disadvantages which would arise, for
the proposed merger would so increase the size and control of
United as to make it the predominant air carrier in the region,
thus giving it a competitive advantage in obtaining business. The
Board said:
"It is the concentration of ownership and control which is fatal to
the operation of a competitive economy. To allow one air carrier to

obtain control of air transportation in the West coast area greatly in
excess of that possessed by competitors would, in our opinion, seriously
endanger the develpment of a properly balanced air-transportation system in this region ..."103

Furthermore, it was thought unwise, from a competitive standpoint, to eliminate Western which was the only local company
operating a north-south route in the area west of the Rocky Mountains. Such elimination would be contrary to a balanced system of
air transportation, for it was to be expected that a local carrier
would develop local business to a greater degree than a transcontinental carrier.
As the proposed merger was found to be outside the public
interest, on the above grounds, the Board concluded that there
was no necessity to consider the proviso of Section 408 (b) relative to monopoly. Apparently, therefore, the proviso is only a supplemental condition to the question of public interest and it would
seemingly follow that even though the public interest would be
served by a proposed acquisition of control, if the arrangement
violates the proviso by creating a monopoly in air transportation,
the acquisition or merger must be disapproved. On the other hand,
if, as in the case at bar, the arrangement is contrary to the public
interest and approval is withheld, no consideration of the proviso
is necessary, though it must be understood that the factor of
7 0

103 Id.at 5 .
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restraint of competition is also an element to be considered in
determining the public interest.
In a case decided the same day between the same two parties
relative to an interchange of equipment agreement,' the proviso
was discussed in detail. The case concerned an agreement providing for the leasing by the companies to each other of sleeper aircraft owned by them respectively. By such action through service
could be provided, as a change of planes which caused inconvenience to sleeper passengers would be eliminated. TWA intervened, contending that the arrangement would give United a virtual monopoly.
The improvement in service and the elimination of inconvenience to passengers was deemed to be in the public interest, not
inconsistent with it. The Board then turned its attention to the
question whether the agreement resulted in the creation of a
monopoly and thereby restrained competition or jeopardized another air carrier not a party thereto. In construing the statutory
proviso, it was determined that any merger, acquisition of control,
combination, lease, operating contract "which restrains competition or jeopardizes another air carrier is prohibited only in the
event that either one or both of such results will follow from the
creation of a monopoly or monopolies." '' A broad definition of
the term "monopoly," as "embracing any combination the tendency of which is to prevent competition in its broad and general
sense, and to control prices to the detriment of the public,''. was
rejected. The Board accepted as applicable a definition of "monopoly" which rendered a meaning to the term as "a particular degree
of control of air transportation, or any phase thereof, in any territory or section of the country."' ' °7

The interchange of equipment agreement was found not to give
104 United Airlines Transport Corp. and Western Air Express Corp.-Interchange of
Equipment, 1 C. A. A. 723 (1940).
o20
Id. at 737.
106 Id. at 733.
107 Id. at 734.
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United control or dominance of Western ;"' it did not violate the
terms of the proviso by creating a monopoly in air transportation;
and as it benefited the public interest it was approved. '
Decisions in accord with the principles of these two cases were
rendered in later cases, the Board considering closely the issue of
monopoly in restraint of competition which might be a consequence of any proposed merger. Where TWA sought approval for
its acquisition of Marquette Airlines, a finding was made that the
acquisition of control would promote the public interest to the
extent that certain improvements in service and development of
the traffic potential of the area would ensue. It was ascertained
that by the acquisition, TWA would not gain the "degree of control of air transportation or some phase thereof within a particular section of the country, necessary to constitute a monopoly
therein .....
as it would be subjected to competition from another
trans-continental air carrier at each point on its route.
In the Acquisition of Inland Airlines by Western Airlines case,"'
the two carriers in question served different areas not competing
with each other. Because of this there could be no monopoly resulting or any lessening of air service to the general public through
an elimination of competitive services.
The acquisition of Mirow Air Service by Wien Alaska Airlines1.
was approved even though by such acquisition Wien became the
largest operator in the territory. It was concluded that monopoly
would not result for other carriers continued to offer competing
services in the area. But in subsequent cases, as in the Acquisition
of Western case, mergers were denied where the result would have
108 id. at 735. "There is no evidence of record indicating that Western is controlled
by United or that the latter dictates the managerial policies of the former. No Westeni
stock is owned by United or its officers and directors, and no United stock is owned by
Western or its officers and directors, and there is no provision in the agreement for any
change in stock ownership."
109 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C. A. B. 1, 9 (1940).
110 Western Air Lines, Inc. (Acquisition of Inland Air Lines, Inc.) 4 C. A. B. 654

(1944).
111 Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc. Sigrid Wien and Mirow Air Service. Acquisition of
Mirow Air Service, 3 C. A. B. 207 (1941).
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increased in large degree one carrier's competitive advantage in
the region, so as to stifle competition and retard "the development
of a proper competitive balance." 1 2
In the American Airlines Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines case,"' the Board denied the proposed merger since
it was felt that such merger would violate the public interest
requirement on two grounds. First it was believed that the systems of the two carriers were so uncomplimentary that their
merger would not create an integrated pattern, and second, the
acquisition of control by American would produce a great diversion of traffic from other airlines "as to be inconsistent with sound
economic conditions in air transportation and would impair the
competition .. requisite to assure the development and maintenance of an adequate air transportation system.""'
A further problem is involved in these acquisition cases. If the
acquisition is approved, a transfer of the certificate of public convenience and necessity is involved. This also requires approval
by the Board, such approval 'being predicated upon consistency with the public interest."' The acquisition of Marquette by
TWA.. is illustrative. There, as stated previously, certain public
benefits would be conferred by the acquisition and the agreement
did not violate the monopoly proviso, but it was found that the
price to be paid by TWA as embodied in the agreement was excessive when considered in relation to Marquette's rather limited
assets. Since the amount to be paid was fifteen times the value
of the tangible property, it seemed clear that a big part of the
proposed payment was to effectuate the transfer of the certificate.
112 See Acquisition of Cordova Air Service by Alaska Air Lines, 4 C. A. B. 709, 712
(1944). See also Alaska Airlines, Service to Anchorage, 3 C. A. B. 522 (1942) wherein
Pan American's proposed acquisition of Lavery Airways was refused because it would
adversely affect in great measure another air carrier, Star Air Lines, if it were forced to
compete with Pan American in the same territory.
113 American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
7 C. A. B. 365 (1946).
14 Id. at 379.
"'5 § 401 (1).

116 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C. A. B. 1 (1940).
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The Board declared that a certificate of public convenience and
necessity should not be "treated as if it were a speculative security."'' Such an excessive price would be contrary to the public
interest as it would tend to exhaust or reduce the purchasers'
assets, which might have as a consequence the impairment of
service or an increased financial obligation on the public. The
purchaser airline would offset such an extravagant price through
increased mail payments or increased commercial fares. The
acquisition was therefore denied.
The agreement was then modified by the carriers concerned and
the price scaled down, although the modified price was still excessive in relation to tangible assets. In a supplemental opinion the
acquisition was approved. There was a divided opinion, however,
among the members on the question whether or not the value of
the certificate or the right to operate the route should be included
in the purchase price. The majority took the affirmative position
but held that such value should be considered only for the purpose of the sale and not for rate-making purposes. It was said:

"It is clear that in the sale of the property of an air line the value of
the right to operate the route is an element which the parties necessarily
take into consideration in determining the price which they are willing,

respectively, to receive and pay. The existence of such value in the
exchange of property, as distinguished from value for rate-making
purposes, has long been recognized by the courts and regulatory commissions." ' ,

The dissenting member held to the conclusion that the value
of the operating right should not be included in the purchase price
as he believed such would result in placing an "additional burden upon the public, through the allowance of speculative transactions. " "
117

Id. at 14.

'18

Acquisition of Marquette by TWA (Supplemental Opinion), 2 C. A. B. 409, 412

(1940).
219

Id. at 419.
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B. Control of an Air Carrierby a Surface Carrier.
Section 408 is applicable not only to consolidations, mergers,
and acquisitions of control of air carriers; it applies with equal
force to any other common carrier seeking to acquire control of an
air carrier. Thus, any such arrangement between an air carrier
and a carrier engaged in another form of transportation is unlawful unless approved by the Board. In order to grant approval, as
stipulated in a second proviso of Section 408 (b), a finding is
required to be made that the transaction will "promote the public interest by enabling such carrier other than an air carrier to
use aircraft to public advantage in its operation and will not
restrain competition." The rights of surface carriers to engage in
air transportation are, therefore, vitally affected by these provisions and the manner in which they have been construed. This issue
leads directly to the decisions in the much discussed American
Export Airlines cases. American Export Airlines was organized
in 1937 by American Export Lines, a steamship company, which
held 70 per cent of the former's stock. The airlines, as a subsidiary of the steamship company, then applied to the Civil Aeronautics Board for a certificate of public convenience and necessity
authorizing it to engage in air transportation across the Atlantic
to European points. It also sought approval of the control by the
parent steamship company under Section 408, if the Board found
such to be necessary.1"' Pan American Airways, already operating a transatlantic service, intervened and claimed that the
certificate should not be issued as its own existing service was
adequate, and further that the acquisition of control of the applicant by the steamship company must be approved in accord with
Section 408 prior to the issuance of a certificate. The Board disagreed with Pan American; granted a temporary certificate to
the applicant; and dismissed the application filed under Section
408. The section was construed as applicable "only where the
acquisition of control of a corporate entity occurs at a time when
12 o American Export Airlines, Inc. (Trans-Atlantic Service) 2 C. A. B. 16 (1940).
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that entity is already an air carrier. 12 1 The applicant was not
an air carrier at the time of the acquisition and could not be an
air carrier until a certificate of convenience and necessity was
issued and it undertook to engage in air transportation. The words
"to acquire control of an air carrier" used in Section 408 (a) (5)
were taken to mean just that, and not the acquisition of some
nebulous organization, newly formed, with no particular status
yet conferred. To reiterate, as the applicant was not an air carrier at the time the steamship company obtained control, no acquisition within the meaning of the statute had occurred and consequently the Board was without jurisdiction over the relationship.
Pan American Airways then appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.1 2"' The Court reversed the Board's decision
pertaining to the application under Section 408 and remanded
the case for a determination on the merits. The Court, agreeing
with Mr. Ryan who had dissented from the Board's decision, took
the view that the Board did have jurisdiction to rule on the acquisition of control, and that its action in dismissing the application
was an "unduly literal interpretation of subdivision (5)."1" It was
determined that the language used therein "to acquire control of
any air carrier in any manner whatsoever" included all the steps
or series of events resulting in the control of the applicant by the
steamship company.
The Court pointed out the anomaly which would have resulted
from the Board's decision, for it was apparent that under such a
decision it would be possible for any surface carrier to form a
subsidiary, wholly controlled by it, for the purpose of engaging
in air transportation and thus circumvent the requirements of
Section 408 (b). It would be strange to require the Board's
approval for an acquisition of control by a surface carrier over
an existing carrier and not require it when control is acquired
323

Id. at 46.

122 Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board and American Export Air.

lines. Inc., 121 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
12

Id. at 815.
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prior to the time the entity becomes an air carrier. As far as the
public interest is concerned, the results are the same, for control of an air carrier has been acquired in one way or another.
In the subsequent proceeding,"2 4 the Board was then required
to approve the control of the applicant by the parent company if
it found such control to be in accord with Section 408 (b). The
acquisition of control was disapproved as it did not meet the conditions set forth in the second proviso. It was declared:
"... this proviso is extremely restrictive and only those limited air
transport services which are auxiliary and supplemental to other transthereto, can meet
port operations, and which are therefore incidental
25
the conditions laid down by that proviso." 1
As the air transport services of the subsidiary airlines were

not auxiliary and supplemental to the steamship operations, the
steamship company was required to divest itself of control of the
air carrier.
But the Board did not stop with the finding that surface carriers entering the field of air transportation through subsidiaries,
whether by acquisition of an existing carrier or by organization
of a subsidiary intended to function as an air carrier, must meet
the requirements of Section 408 (b). It was further determined
that a carrier engaged in other forms of transportation seeking
to enter air transportation directly, in its own name, must meet

these same requirements. Such a construction was felt to be necessary due to the broad interpretation placed upon the pertinent
sections by the Court of Circuit Appeals. The Board said:
"Under this construction of the statute no sound basis appears for
distinguishing between an undertaking of a carrier engaged in another
form of transportation to engage in air transportation through a subsidiary and its undertaking to engage in the air transportation field
directly.... It seems clear that Congress must have intended the same
principles to apply to both situations because there is no sound basis
124American Export Airlines, Inc.-American Export Lines Control-American
Export Airlines, 3 C. A. B. 619 (1942).
'25d.at 624.
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for distinguishing between these situations so far as the public interest
is concerned."

12

Thus, when a surface carrier applies for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to engage in air transportation, it must
show in relation to the public convenience and necessity, as a condition to the issuance of a certificate, that there is compliance
with the proviso of Section 408 (b).
In a supplemental opinion 7 where American Export Airlines
contended that the acquisition of control did meet the second proviso of Section 408 (b), the Board again withheld its approval
stating that "the air service is not an integral part of the steamship operation but constitutes instead an alternative means of
transportation to the steamship service from point of origin to
destination."' 8 The Board elaborated its opinion that it had long
been the intent of Congress that the various forms of transportation should be independent of each other. Because of this longestablished policy and the fact that such congressional intent was
also embodied in the language of the Civil Aeronautics Act, a
construction severely limiting the entrance of other forms of
transportation into the air carrier industry was justified.
Thus a surface carrier must show, in accord with the second
proviso of Section 408 (b), that its proposed air transport operations will promote the public interest by enabling the surface
carrier to use aircraft to public advantage in its operations. As
construed by the Board only those air transport operations which
are supplemental, auxiliary or incidental to the surface carrier's
other transport operations can meet the test. It is therefore doubted
whether any considerable number of carriers by water or by land
can qualify. 2
126

Id. at 625.

American Export Lines, Control of American Export Airlines (Supplemental
Opinion) 4 C. A. B. 104 (1943).
12"

226

Id. at 109.

129 It may be noted that Section 408 does not apply to an acquisition of control by

surface carriers or air carriers prior to the effective date of the Act. The Board stated
in Boston & Maine & Maine Central Railroads, Control-Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4
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The Board's interpretation was criticized and it was stated that
it erred in requiring such compliance with the second proviso,
especially in those cases where surface carriers are desirous of
directly engaging in air transportation and there is no question of
acquisition of control. The conclusion that Congress intended that
surface carriers were to be excluded in such a manner from air
transportation was disputed. The critics believe that Congress
intended entrance by surface carriers to the same extent as the
railroads have been permitted to enter the field of motor transportation. 3 '
The Board has now partially retreated from its former stand
at the behest of nine steamship companies petitioning for an investigation of the problem.' The Board reconsidered the question
of the direct participation by surface carriers in air transport
and overruled the dictum which required a surface carrier to show
as a condition to the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity that there had been compliance with the
proviso of Section 408 (b). No legal requirement was found to
exist that a surface carrier proposing air transport operations must
first meet the test of promoting the public interest by enabling
the surface carrier to use aircraft to public advantage in its operations. Nevertheless the Board added that the policy as embodied
in the test should be considered. The Board was required to limit
the entry of surface carriers to those operations whereby the public interest would be promoted through the use of aircraft to
public advantage in the carrier's surface transport unless the
record revealed that service by a surface carrier was required
even though it were a surface carrier. In other words the policy
C. A. B. 379, 386 (1943) : "The courmt do not favor constructions which give retroactive
effect to legislation, and in the absence of language expressing a contrary intent, Section
408 must be construed as having only a prospective effect."
130 See Baggett, "Are Surface Carriers Grounded by Law?" 31 VA. L. REV. 337
(1945). Also see Henry, "Acquisition of Control of an Air Carrierby Another Common
.L Rxv. 719
CarrierUnder the Civil Aeronautics Act," Editorial Note, 10 GEo. WAS.
(1942).
131 Petition of American President Lines, Ltd., et al. 2 C. C. H. Av. Law. Rep.
ff21,011 (1947).
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as embodied in the proviso should be considered as one of the
standards guiding the Board in its determination as to whether a
certificate of public convenience and necessity should be granted.
Such a construction was believed to be necessary because of the
congressional and statutory intent to regulate carefully the engaging of surface carriers in air transportation.
C. Interlocking Relationships.
Section 409 (a) prohibits interlocking relationships. Stated
broadly, the Act makes it unlawful for an officer or director of
an air carrier or for a representative of such officer or director
to be an officer, director, member or controlling stockholder in
another air carrier, or any other common carrier or any person
engaged in any phase of aeronautics unless the interlocking relationship is approved by the Board as not adverse to the public
interest. The section does not require notice and hearing for the
determination of the applications for approval of these relationships, hence many of them have been decided informally. Nevertheless, when doubt arises and the proceeding is considered vital
to the public interest, formal hearings are held. 12 '
As the Board has no precise standard to guide it in resolving
the public interest other than the partial guide provided in Section 2, the Declaration of Policy, it has declared that it must
proceed cautiously in exercising discretion in excepting any
interlocking relationship from the prohibition of the section. Consequently, the applicant requesting approval for any such relationship is required to bear the burden of proof by an affirmative
showing that the public interest will not be adversely affected by
the proposed relationship. 3
In passing upon those relationships in which an officer or director is common to both an air carrier and a person engaged in any
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, 18 (1941).
133 Ames-Continental Air Lines, Interlocking Relationship, I C. C. A. 498, 500
(1939).
132
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other phase of aeronautics," ' it has been necessary to measure
the breadth of the term, "any other phase of aeronautics." 1 "'
Section 1 (1) of the Act defines aeronautics as the "science and
art of flight." This definition when used in conjunction with the
words, "any phase" would seem to include any business having
only a remote relation with aviation. It was believed that Congress did not intend such a strict interpretation, and it has been
concluded in this respect that"Section 409 (a) of the Act was designed to protect the public
interest in cases where such interest appears with reasonably clarity;
and not to include cases where that interest is only very remotely

involved."

13C

In these cases the Board is interested in determining whethei
or not an actual or potential conflict of interests will result by
the approval of the interlocking relationship, such conflicts of
interest being considered as adverse to the public interest. This
is illustrated by the decision in the Ames-Continental Airlines.
Interlocking Relationship."7 There approval was requested in
order to permit a director of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to
serve concurrently as a director of Continental Air Lines. Lockheed was a manufacturer of commercial aircraft from whom Continental had purchased in the past and intended to purchase in the
future aircraft to be used in its air carrier operations. Although
it was shown that the director in question had not participated in
any negotiations for the purchase of planes, the application was
refused on the grounds of conflict of interest between the air carrier and the aircraft manufacturer. It was believed that situations
could possibly arise whereby a director common to both companies
could be placed in an unfavorable position, thus being prevented
from acting in the best interest of either concern. There was a
(a).
Interlocking Relationship-W. A. Patterson, et al. 3 C. A. B. 711 (1942).
Id. at 714.

34 § 409

135
136

237 Ames-Continental Air Lines, Interlocking Relationship, 1 C. A. A. 498, 500
(1939).
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danger of the possible payment of excessive price by the carrier
through such a relationship as well as a possible limiting of the
carrier's freedom in the choice of its equipment. The fact that no
present unethical purpose was found to exist was by no means
conclusive.
"The fact remains that the type of relationship here sought to be
created is such as to furnish a medium through which the desirable
arms-length relationship between buyer and seller may be materially
altered." 131
An application was disapproved which would result in a common directorship between an air carrier and an air investment
company, whose business was that of holding stocks of aviation
enterprises.' 3' There are marked hazards involved in such a relationship inasmuch as it would make possible abuses operating to
the detriment of the carrier but benefiting the investment company, in that the common director would be enabled to disclose
confidential carrier information to the company holding stocks
of the carrier. Moreover, the director could influence air carrier
policy in such a manner as to benefit the stock-holding company,
and injure the air carrier.
Interlocking relationships between an air carrier and a concern
whose business is the operation of an airport and flying school
have been approved. 4 A conflict of interest was found not to
exist where the relationship was between an air carrier and a
manufacturer of military aircraft solely.1 4' Again an application
was held not adverse to the public interest where there was proposed a common directorship in an airline and a company organized to conduct studies and research to aid in the development of
a phase of air transportation, air express and air cargo." '
Id. at 501.
Cohu-TWA, Inc.-Interlocking Relationship, 1 C. A. A. 547 (1940).
140 Darling-Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc.-Interlocking Relationships, 1 C. A. A.
641 (1940).
141 Cohu-TWA, Inc.-Interlocking Relationship, 1 C. A. A. 547 (1940).
142 Interlocking Relationship-W. A. Patterson, et al. 3 C. A. B. 711 (1942).
138

1"9
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D. Loans, Methods of Competition, and Agreements.
The Board is given authority to approve or disapprove in whole
or in part loans or other financial aid from the Federal Government to any air carrier,'' and a loan is not to be made unless
approval is granted-its terms and conditions to be prescribed by
the Board. It has been decided that the type of equipment to be
used is a managerial problem, and that when a loan is requested
for the purposes of purchasing new equipment, managerial judgment as to the type of equipment should be permitted to control
unless exercised contrary to the public interest." '
Section 411 is concerned with unfair methods and practices
of competition and empowers the Board upon its own initiative
or upon complaint of air carriers to investigate and determine
whether or not such unfair practices are being pursued. If such
is found to be true, a cease and desist order is to be issued after
notice and hearing. The section applies only to unfair methods
and practices cbmmitted or in the process of being committed;
it is applicable "only to past or existing practices or methods of
competition.""'
Section 412 requires filing of all contracts between air carriers, air carriers and foreign air carriers, or other carriers and
includes pooling agreements as well as other cooperative working arrangements. If not adverse to the public interest or in violation of the Act, these agreements are to be approved. It may
be observed that both Sections 408 and 412 may be applicable
to a given agreement in some instances. The pooling or interchange of equipment agreement entered into by Western Air
Express and United Airlines is an example. Section 408 speaks
in terms of an acquisition of control by one carrier of another;
an intercorporate agreement such as a lease, purchase, or operating contract, providing for the operation of the properties "or
148 § 410.

14 Northwest Airlines, Inc.-RFC Loan, 1 C. A. A. 60 (1939).
145 United Airlines Transport Corp. and Western Express Corp., Interchange of
Equipment, 1 C. A. A. 723, 725 (1940).
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any substantial part thereof" of any air carrier, comes within its
terms. Hence, if the agreement is one not inclusive of the operation of a substantial part of the properties, it is sufficient if it
meets the public interest test of Section 412 (b). On the other
hand, if a substantial part of the properties of an air carrier
entering into the lease, purchase or operating contract is affected,
a hearing must be held and the additional test of the first proviso
in Section 408 (b) must be met, for there is greater possibility
of control.'
An agreement between Pan American Airways, The Matson
Navigation Company and Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company1. involved a decision under Section 412. It was shown that
Matson, the principal American steamship company in the Pacific
area, controlled Inter-Island, also a steamship company which provided local Hawaiian steamship operations and which in turn
controlled a local Hawaiian airline. The contract entered into by
three companies prior to the enactment of the Act related to the
formation of a jointly owned and operated local air service
between the West Coast of the United States and Hawaii. It was
determined that such a joint operation would be adverse to the
public interest for, by a pooling of the resources of the three
powerful corporations, they would be placed in such a strong
position as to enable them to stifle present and future outside
competition between the Coast and Hawaii.
Another objectionable feature of the contract was one whereby
Pan American agreed not to conduct more flights between the
West Coast and Hawaii than it did between Hawaii and points
beyond. The Board concluded that the apportionment of territory
in this manner would tend to restrain competition, and such a
restraint would be adverse to the public interest. Moreover, disapproval was voiced of any agreement with provisions included,
whereby the agents of another form of transportation were to be
18

Id. at 727.
14TPan American Airways, Inc.-Pan Amrican.Matson-Inter Island Contract, 3
C. A. B. 540 (1942).
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appointed the exclusive agents for an airline in certain regions,
inasmuch as it would give the agents of a rival form of transportation a great influence in the development of air transportation,
and this was thought to be undesirable.
In two cases previously discussed, Section 412 was held
applicable. In the Airline Pass Agreement case, 4 ' the agreement
was not deemed adverse to the public interest test. On the contrary, such an agreement, having as its purpose the restricting of
free or reduced rate passes, was considered to be in accord with
the public interest. The other case was that of the Air Travel
Card'. agreement. It was adjudged there that such a plan would
be in the public interest if certain modifications were carried out.
One such modification thought to be necessary was the changing
of a provision in the agreement prohibiting a carrier from soliciting as subscribers users of air transportation who were already
subscribers through another air carrier. The Board felt that this
provision would tend to curtail free competition.
The great majority of these agreements are disposed of by
routine filing after careful scrutiny to see if action should be
taken in the public interest. They are generally of two classes
-those between individual carriers relating to their problems of
operation, or those to which all carriers subscribe in order to
inaugurate certain uniform actions as exemplified by the resolutions of the Air Traffic Conference or the Air Transport Association of America. 50
These regulations regarding business practices in the main
strike at monopoly and it seems evident that Congress in drafting
the Act intended that there should be no substantial monopoly in
air transport. In line with Section 2 stating that the Board should
consider competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
8
Airline Pass Agreement, 1 C. A. A. 677 (1940).
149 Air Transport Discount Investigation, 3 C. A. B. 242 (1942).
150 ANNUAL REporr OF THE CInI AERONAUTICS Bolan, 29 (1942).

14
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development of air transportation in determining the public interest, the Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted its policy of balanced
competition both as regards the issuance of certificates for new
routes or extensions of existing routes and its approval of these
intercorporate relationships between carriers. Acquisitions of controls and mergers of airlines have not been viewed with favor in
the past if competition were lessened thereby. However, due to
financial difficulties of certain of the smaller air carriers at the
present time, there is indication that such mergers may be permitted in order to strengthen the air system and to prevent the
weaker carriers from plunging into bankruptcy."' The query may
then be raised as to the lengths the Board can go in approving
mergers. As far as the public interest is concerned there is no
absolute prohibition of decrease in competition to the point of
monopoly if the public need is served thereby. Section 2 cannot be
construed to require competition or to prohibit monopoly. Nevertheless, as has been shown, any merger must meet the proviso of
Section 408 (b) and the Board's interpretation thereunder which
prohibits monopoly in restraint of competition. Thus the Board
will be checkmated in approving any merger creating such a
monopoly even though it is found to be in the public interest.
It is too early to venture an opinion, for as mentioned earlier,
the slump in airline business may be only temporary. If this
proves to be true, the airlines now operating in the red may well
overcome their difficulties, thus alleviating the necessity for such
action.
It has been said that because of the great improvements and
advancements made in aviation during the period of World
War II, the Civil Aeronautics Act is already outmoded for the
air world as it exists today and as it will exist in the future."' If
151 See an article entitled The Airline Squeeze, Fortune, v. 35, 117 (May 1947);
Time, Feb. 24, 1947, p. 92.
152 See Domestic Air Transportation, 1 EDITORIAL RESEAR CH RE'ORTs, 393 (1944).
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this proves to be the case, and if the situation cannot be coped with
under the present enactment, it is hoped that whatever legislation
follows, will accomplish as much for the air transportation of
tomorrow as the present statute has accomplished since its inception.

